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# MSU Project Update: 4/26/13

## “Radiation Tolerant Computing”

NASA Marshall Space Flight Center  
Huntsville, AL

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**Dr. Brock J. LaMer**

Associate Professor

**Ray Weber**

Graduate Student

*(Ph.D., exp May 2014)*

Electrical & Computer Engineering


Montana State University

**Justin Hogan**

Graduate Student

*(Ph.D., exp May 2014)*

*Currently at Cyclotron...*




## Support the Computing Needs of Space Exploration & Science

- Computation (2,000 MIPs)
- Power Efficiency (200 MIPs/Watt)
- Mass (\$100/lb by 2025)
- Reliability (99.99999% availability, instant recovery during critical operation)



### Space Launch System (SLS)



## Use COTS FPGAs as the Computing Fabric

- Take advantage of process trends for computation and power efficiency

## Support Reconfigurable Computing


- RC can increase computation through hardware optimization
- RC can decrease power through hardware efficiency
- RC can reduce mass through hardware reuse
- RC enables novel fault mitigation architectures

## Radiation Tolerance Through Underlying Architecture

- Extend Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) to include *spares*
- Spatial Avoidance of faults to increase foreground availability
- Continually *scrub* configuration memory in background

## Radiation “Awareness” through an External Sensor

- Provides potential fault awareness in unused regions (e.g., no TMR)
- Direct scrubber location to decrease correction latency



## On Earth Our Computers are Protected

- Our magnetic field deflects the majority of the radiation
- Our atmosphere attenuates the radiation that gets through our magnetic field

## Our Satellites Operate In Trapped Radiation in the Van Allen Belts


- High flux of trapped electrons and protons

## In Deep Space, Nothing is Protected


- Radiation from our sun
- Radiation from other stars
- Particles & electromagnetic

## We Care About Ionizing Radiation


- Unwanted charge injection effects semiconductors
  - High energy protons, Heavy Ions
- You Are Here**



## There are two broad categories of radiation effects:




### 1) Total Ionizing Dose (TID)



- Long term, cumulative damage due to lower energy proton and electrons
- Charge trapping results in permanent damage to devices.

### 2) Single Event Effects (SEE)




- By itself, does not cause permanent damage.
- Electron/hole pair creation leads to current transients that can change the state of a logic circuit.
- Permanent damage can result from secondary interactions (e.g., latch-up)



## TID Failure Mechanisms


### 1. Oxide Breakdown

- Threshold shifts,
- Gate leakage,
- Timing changes
- Actually gets better in modern processes





**Hole Trapping**

- EHP formed by ionization
- Electrons recombine quicker due to faster mobility
- Holes get "stuck" due to lower mobility
- Lowers  $V_t$  by effectively "thinning" the oxide
- $V_t$  eventually goes negative turning on MOS



**Interface Trapping**


- The Si/SiO<sub>2</sub> interface typically contains Si/H bonds
- This is due to the annealing process in hydrogen
- When this bond is severed, H will bond with itself
- This leaves a dangling Si bond with net positive charge
- This initially lowers  $V_t$  and then ultimately raises it.



### 2. Leakage Currents



- Hole trapping slowly "dopes" field oxides to become conductive
- Dominant failure mechanism for commercial processes

**Shallow Trench to Thin Oxide Interface (STI)**  
- Radiation "dopes" the Field Oxide to become conductive and allows current to flow through isolation regions




## TID Mitigation Techniques

1. Radiation Hardened by Design (RHBD)
  - Special layout techniques in commercial process
  - Enclosed Transistors
  - Guard Rings
2. Radiation Hardened by Process (RHBP)
  - Special materials used (e.g., SOI)
3. Shielding
  - Effective for lower energy particles
  - Diminishing returns above 0.25" (Al)



## MSU Approach Does Not Target TID

- Although modern COTS parts are less susceptible to TID than older parts.
- Spatial avoidance technique “could” avoid permanently damaged regions of IC




**Shield Thickness  
vs.  
Dose Rate (LEO)**



## SEE Fault Mechanisms


### 1. Single Event Transients (SET)

- A pulse that can flip a gate
- Glitches in combinational logic




### 2. Single Event Upset (SEU)

- The glitch is captured by a storage device resulting in a state change



### 3. Single Event Functional IRQ (SEFI)

- The system is put into a state that causes function failure that cannot be resolved through normal operation.
- Requires reset, power cycling or reprogramming.







## SEE Mitigation Techniques

1. Architecture: Triple Module Redundancy
  - Triplicate each circuit
  - Use a majority voter to produce output
2. Background Checking: Scrubbing
  - Compare contents of a memory device to a “Golden Copy”
  - Golden Copy is contained in a radiation immune technology (fuse-based memory, MROM, etc...)

**Note:** TMR+Scrubbing is the recommended mitigation approach for FPGA-based aerospace computers






## Use COTS FPGAs

1. Increased Computation by Tracking Commercial Processes
2. Increased Power Efficiency by Tracking Commercial Processes
3. SRAM-based FPGAs support Reconfigurable Computing

## However, FPGA's are Uniquely Susceptible

1. Single Event Effects
  - SETs/SEUs in the logic blocks
  - SETs in the routing
  - SEUs in the configuration memory for the logic blocks (SEFI)
  - SEUs in the configuration memory for the routing (SEFI)

### Radiation Strikes in the Circuit Fabric (Logic + Routing)




### Radiation Strikes in the Configuration Memory (Logic + Routing)

## A Comprehensive, Radiation Tolerant Architecture Is Needed...



## Fault Tolerance Through Abundant Spares

1. TMR + Spares
  - 3 Tiles run in TMR with the rest reserved as spares
2. Spatial Avoidance and Background Repair
  - If TMR detects a fault, the damaged tile is replaced with a spare and foreground operation continues
  - The tile is “repaired” in the background via PR
3. Scrubbing
  - Blind scrubbing continually runs through tiles (fast)
  - Readback scrubbing periodically runs through rest of fabric (slower)
4. External Radiation Sensor
  - An external spatial radiation sensor provides awareness of potential strike



16 MicroBlaze Processors on Virtex-6




Precedent: Shuttle Flight Computer  
(TMR + Spare)



## Why do it this way?


*With Spares, it basically becomes a flow-problem:*

- If the repair rate is faster than the incoming fault rate, you're safe.
- If the repair rate is slightly slower than the incoming fault rate, spares give you additional time.
- The additional time can accommodate varying flux rates.
- Abundant resources on an FPGA enable dynamic scaling of the number of spares. (e.g., build a bigger tub in real time)




## Practical Reason's for Doing It this Way

- Bringing up a spare tile is faster than PR (us vs. ms). This means foreground availability can be increased if repair (e.g., PR of damaged tile) is conducted in the background..
- Performing PR of the entire tile is much simpler than trying to track at a finer granularity (e.g., a specific CLB). Partial bit streams generated by the tool contain all the necessary information about a tile configuration.
- PR of a tile also takes care of both SEUs in the circuit fabric & configuration SRAM so the system doesn't care which one occurred.
- The “spares” are held in reset to reduce power. This is as opposed to running in N-MR with every tile voting.
- The sensor is faster at detecting faults that aren't detected by active circuitry (e.g., a spare not in TMR) and the scrubber can be intelligently directed.



## Modeling: Is this an improvement to TMR+Scrubbing?

- We use a Markov Model to predict *Mean-Time-Before-Failure*
  - 16 tile MicroBlaze system on Virtex-6 (3+13)
  - $\lambda$  is fault rate
  - $\mu$  is repair rate




## Modeling: Fault & Repair Rates

### Fault Rate ( $\lambda$ )

- Derived from CREME96 tool for 4 different orbits
- Used LET fault data from V4

ORBITAL FAULT RATES FROM CREME96, IN FAULTS/DEVICE/SECOND

	Average	Worst Week	Peak 5 Minutes
ISS	0.0003479	3.544	72.96
HEO	0.08788	120.2	2398
E1P	0.003464	29.93	612.3
GEO	.0002494	149.8	3059



### Repair Rate ( $\mu$ )

- Measured empirically in lab on V6 system

MEASURED SCRUBBING RATES, IN SECONDS

Clock Rate	Blind	Readback, undamaged	Readback, damaged
25 MHz	2.97	5.31	6.35





## Modeling Our Approach: Results

### Baseline System (TMR+scrubbing)

MTBF FOR BASELINE TMR+SCRUBBING SYSTEM (IN SECONDS)

		Average	Worst Week	Peak 5 Min.
Blind	ISS	1.08E+08	3.19E+00	1.07E-01
	HEO	1.77E+03	6.43E-02	3.20E-03
	E1P	1.09E+06	2.69E-01	1.25E-02
	GEO	2.09E+08	5.14E-02	2.50E-03
RB	ISS	6.00E+07	2.73E+00	1.06E-01
	HEO	1.03E+03	6.39E-02	3.20E-03
	E1P	6.07E+05	2.63E-01	1.25E-02
	GEO	1.17E+08	5.12E-02	2.50E-03

### Our System (TMR+scrubbing+spares)

MTBF FOR TMR+SCRUBBING+SPARES SYSTEM (IN SECONDS)

		Average	Worst Week	Peak 5 Min.
Blind	ISS	3.57E+43	7.83E+01	1.25E+00
	HEO	3.75E+11	7.41E-01	3.59E-02
	E1P	4.46E+29	3.30E+00	1.41E-01
	GEO	3.74E+45	5.90E-01	2.81E-02
RB	ISS	8.26E+41	5.49E+01	1.23E+00
	HEO	2.10E+10	7.33E-01	3.59E-02
	E1P	1.08E+28	3.16E+00	1.41E-01
	GEO	8.63E+43	5.85E-01	2.81E-02

### Improvement

INCREASE IN MTBF AFTER ADDITION OF SPARES (%)

		Average	Worst Week	Peak 5 Min.
Blind	ISS	3.31E+35%	2356.07%	1067.45%
	HEO	2.12E+08%	1051.79%	1021.88%
	E1P	4.10E+23%	1127.98%	1031.20%
	GEO	1.78E+37%	1047.86%	1024.00%
RB	ISS	1.38E+34%	1912.98%	1058.51%
	HEO	2.05E+07%	1046.32%	1021.88%
	E1P	1.78E+22%	1103.77%	1028.80%
	GEO	7.40E+35%	1042.38%	1024.00%



**Ok, it looks promising...**




## Let's Build and Test...

- Initial computer architecture tested on Xilinx Virtex-5 evaluation board (2007-2010).
- Initial sensor was fabricated as a 1-sided fabrication sequence, implemented on a breadboard.
- Funded through a variety of senior design projects from NASA and research start-up funds from Montana Space Grant.
- Bench top testing


Clint Gauer (MSEE, 20010) giving demo at MSFC in 2010



“3+61 pBlaze Many Core”



“3+13 pBlaze Many Core w PR”



“Spatial Radiation Sensor”



## Let's Build and Test...



**Clint Gauer (MSU) giving Andrew Keys (NASA) Dynamic Recovery IO System Demonstration**



**Brock LaMeris (MSU) giving Mike Watson (NASA) the Spatial Radiation Sensor Demo**




## Build and Test Cont...

- Funding from NASA EPSCoR allows increasing TRL.


### EPSCoR Project Objectives

- Increase many-tile system to TRL-5
  - Fabricate spatial radiation sensor
  - Integrated Sensor with many-tile system
  - Test full system in cyclotron
- 
- Functional testing still on bench top.

Todd Buerkle (MSEE, 2011) and Jenny Hane (MSEE, 2011) giving demonstrations at MSFC (2011)




“Many-Tile Integrated with Custom Sensor”



## Build and Test Cont...

- Funding from NASA Education Office allows local balloon flights of system.
- Tests allow more sophisticated payload form-factor to be pursued.





Balloon Flight in Montana, summer of 2011.



## Build and Test Cont...

- Cyclotron testing of sensor commences.
- Accepted into & completed NASA/LSU HASP Balloon program (130,000 ft for 10 hours)
- Grad students sent to “Rock-On” program to learn how to develop sounding rocket payloads.
- Final Payload Form Factor Pursued (e.g., cube-sat).



Payload Form Factor

Rock-On Workshop,  
June 2012




Justin

Ray


MSU  
Payload

HASP Flight,  
Sept 2012



## Build and Test Cont...

- Funded by OCT-Game Changing Technology Program for sub-orbital flight demonstration (2013-2014...)




2012 News Article,  
Bozeman  
Chronicle



## Build and Test Cont...

- Full Cube Fabrication Complete
  - Virtex-6, 9 processor many-tile system.
  - Relocation & Repair
  - Background scrubbing (blind & readback)
  - Support for 2 stacked sensors
  - Powered by single voltage (battery or provided)
- Full System Test at Cyclotron

## Full Custom Computer System Completed




## Texas A&M Cyclotron Testing




**Ray Weber**  
Assembling Stack



**Justin Hogan** Assembling  
Translation Stage



**Stack Ready**  
For Beam



**MSU Stack in Beam**





## Upcoming Testing....

- Local Balloon Flights summer of 2013
- Will Fly on HASP again in September 2013
- Sounding Rocket Flight Late 2013 or early 2014




## What Research Has Been Uncovered?

- Faults in Routing – On-chip network could help
- Multiple Bit Upsets – Solutions for Single-Point of Failure
- New Applications of the Sensor
  - Thin, pixilated sensors to identify location AND species
  - Flexible sensing fabric for more accurate detection of ionizing radiation.
  - Dual sensor + solar cell technology

## Where we want to go....

- More test data, more flights, cube-sat...



# Demo

